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Introduction
A key element in the architecture of the EMU is the Stability and Growth Pact signed in Amsterdam
in 1997. It lays down more precise and at the same time more stringent rules for member countries’ fiscal
policy  conduct  than  those  of  Articles  103,  104  and  109  of  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht.1 By making  the
excessive deficit procedures (EDP) governing the Commission’s intervention in the case of deficits above
the  3  percent  ceiling  more  transparent,  the  Pact  seeks  to  strengthen  the  fiscal  constraints  on  member
countries in order to prevent the excessive build-up of debt.
The  institution  of  these  constraints  rests  on  the  conviction  that  when  fiscal  policy  is  set
independently by each country, a common monetary policy generates externalities that keep the market from
imposing  sufficient  fiscal  discipline.  The  argument  develops  around  two  main  lines.  Firstly,  prodigal
countries can exert pressures on ECB to reduce the real value of their debt via higher inflation. 2 An ECB
that  was not  insensitive  to  the  need of  stabilizing output  could  give way,  after  the  fact,  to  inflationary
pressures. Secondly, when a member country’s avowed intention not to meet its obligations threatens the
financial stability of the entire Union, it is hard to believe that the ECB would not intervene bailing-out the
distressed country, despite the fact that this is expressly prohibited by the Maastricht Treaty. The cost of the
ECB intervention would ultimately be borne by all countries in the Union.
Thus, the crucial issue is the profligate country’s decision to renege on its debt either implicitly (via
surprise inflation) or explicitly by openly declaring the decision for a haircut. Taking a political economy
approach in this paper we inquire into the conditions under which national governments may benefit from a
partial or total repudiation of their debt. Furthermore we investigate the form of repudiation that might be
observed in equilibrium. 
Our starting point is the recognition that the decision to tax the debt, either explicitly or implicitly,
has a wealth redistribution effect first of all within the fiscally prodigal country. Thus, such decision will
depend  on  how  the  political  dispute  between  debt-holders  and  tax-payers  is  internally  composed.  To
formalise this conflict we consider a two period, two country economy with overlapping generations. The
countries  belong to  a  Monetary  Union  where  monetary  policy is  decided  by the  Union’s  Central  Bank
(UCB) and fiscal policy is set independently by the individual countries.
Following the common agency approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) we model the political
game as a menù auction in which conflicting lobbies (identified by families with different preferences about
debt  repudiation)  offer  monetary contribution in an effort  to influence the governments’  policy choices.
1 The  Treaty  puts  a  ceiling  of  3  percent  of  GDP on  general  government  deficits.  Infringement  leads  to  official
reprimands by the European Commission and eventually to pecuniary sanctions, unless the excessive deficit is due to
exceptional, temporary causes. The Stability and Growth Pact specifies the conditions that may be invoked to avoid
sanctions.  A country with an excessive deficit can avoid the fine when it has suffered a 2 percent fall in GDP in a year.
If the contraction of GDP is between 0.75 and 2 percent, suspension of the sanctions can be requested if the Council of
Ministers agrees. In all other cases, countries must rapidly eliminate the excess deficit or face sanctions: first,  non-
interest-bearing deposits and then, after two years, actual fines.
2 A profligate country can try to achieve its desired result by a vote in the Governing Council of the ECB. Otherwise a
country might use political bargaining in an attempt to influence ECB decisions (see Dixit, 2000 on these points).
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Each government maximizes an objective function consisting of a weighted sum of lobbies’ contributions
and of residents’ welfare, net of a cost attached to explicit repudiation. 
The main result  produced by our model  is  that  a debt  management policy of  lowering effective
yields (repudiation) might be the dominant option for self-interested governments whose creditors consists
in  part  of  non  residents.  The  model  gives  us  also  precise  results  concerning  the  form of  repudiation
emerging in equilibrium. As repudiation via inflation reduces the real value of domestic as well as foreign
debt obligations, a country will certainly oppose inflation when it is a net external creditor. The necessary
condition to favor inflation is to be a net external debtor. If members of the UCB’ s board vote according to
home government’s instructions and decisions about inflation are taken by majority voting, then, in our two
country model, inflationary pressures cancel out3.
The only form of repudiation that might emerge in the second period is thus explicit direct taxation
of debt. We show that the higher the value of domestic bonds held by non resident families and the relative
weight attached by the government to residents’ welfare, the higher is explicit repudiation. Under rational
expectations  lenders  anticipate  such result  and in the first  period only public  obligations  which will  be
certainly honoured can be sold (politically viable debt). Market discipline thus constrains the level of debt
issued in the first period. 
Insofar as  explicit  repudiation threatens the soundness of  the banking system (due to the banks’
exposure  in  government  paper)  and  induces  the  UCB to  bail-out  the  distressed  country,  market  fiscal
discipline cannot operate. Fiscal constraints (as the EDP) can thus be read as an instrument for correcting
the inefficiencies created by moral hazard.
The novelty of our contribution rests on the proposition that political support to repudiation, and
thus the likelihood of a fiscal crisis, does not depend on the stock of debt but on the share of it held by non
residents. If this portion were nil repudiation will lack political support and the impact of a larger deficit on
the stability of the Union would also be nil. The EDP would thus not have to be applied. Furthermore we
claim,  differently  from Arnold  and  Lemmen (2001),  that  increasing  the  geographical  diversification  of
banks’ public debt  portfolios  would not  reduce the  risk of  bank failures following a fiscal  crisis  in the
Monetary Union4. According to our model, diversification, increasing the political support to repudiation,
raises countries’ default risk. The likelihood of a fiscal crisis will be thus positively affected by a greater
diversification of banks’ public debt holdings raising banks’ vulnerability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents  the  model.  Section  4 obtains  the  economic  equilibrium.  Section  5  illustrates  the  policy  game.
Section 6 derives the political equilibrium in the second period. Section 7 considers the politically viable
stock of debt to be issued in the first period. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
3 Similar  assumptions  about  the  determination  of  the  UCB's  monetary policy choice  are  made,  among others,  by
Beetsma and Bovemberg (2000) and Debrun (2000).
 
4 See also Eichengreen and Wyploz (1998) on this point. 
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Theoretical support to the Stability and Growth Pact comes from a rapidly growing literature which
investigates  the  interaction  between  the  common  monetary  policy  and  decentralized  fiscal  policies
employing dynamic models in the tradition of Barro Gordon’s (1983) seminal contribution. 
In Chari and Kehoe (1997)5, first fiscal authorities issue nominal debt then, in the second period, the
UCB sets the common rate of inflation so as to maximizes an objective function which depends positively
on output  and negatively  on  the  amount  of  real  debt  obligations.  The  authors  show that  the  larger  the
nominal debt the higher the inflation rate set in the second period. Lenders anticipate such result and in the
first  period  require  a  higher  interest  rate.  This  makes all  other  fiscal  authorities  worse  off.  In the  non-
cooperative equilibrium free-riding produces over-accumulation of public debt.6.
The same result is obtained by Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999,
2001)  in  a  two-period  model  of  debt  accumulation.  According  to  these  works  the  shortsightedness  of
national policy makers, whose decisions are politically distorted since they can be voted out of office, is
responsible for the existence of a deficit bias in the first period (as in Tabellini Alesina, 1990 and Alesina
Tabellini, 1990). The government successor of profligate policy makers will try to solve the inherited debt
problem by making pressures on the Union Central Bank to boost inflation. An inflation bias arises because
of the UCB’s desire to reduce the amount of real debt obligation. By reducing the distortionary taxes needed
to repay debt obligations the UCB realizes the goal of increasing employment and output.
All  the  previous  papers  share  the  view that,  in  absence  of  binding  commitments,  governments
would, ex-post, always prefer to inflate away the debt (implicit repudiation). This stance lack micropolitical
foundation; in fact, only departing from the standard assumption of representative agent the redistributive
consequences and thus the political conflict generated by repudiation decisions can be investigated.7
Following this approach Di Gioacchino et al. (1999, 2000) assume that the incumbent government
takes  political  decisions  to  maximise  monetary  contributions  from  interest  groups.  Thus,  in  deciding
whether to repay the public debt or not, government gauges the political weight of debt-holders and tax-
payers  by the amount of  money that  each  group is  prepared  to spend to  support  the policy decision  it
favours. In the hypothesis that debt is held entirely by residents, the decision entails a pure redistribution of
resources between groups, and, as a consequence, the sum of money contributions from the two sides does
not depend on government’s choice. Government is thus indifferent between repudiating and honouring the
debt. In this situation, even a tiny cost attached to repudiation is enough to make government always honour
the debt.
In this paper we modify Di Gioacchino et al. (1999, 2000) by assuming that national debt is held also by
foreign residents and by distinguishing between explicit and implicit repudiation. In this framework, we are
able to provide precise conditions under which a self-interested government might choose to repudiate its
debt.  We  assume  that  government  does  not  care  only  for  monetary  contributions  but  it  cares  also  for
5  This model has been extended to heterogeneous countries by  Giovannetti et al. (1997)
6In  Chari  and  Kehoe’s  model  debt  is  held  entirely  by  non-European  investors.  A lowering  of  the  real  return  to
government bonds would hit agents whose welfare is not a factor in the UCB’s objective function.
7 The political economy literature of debt repudiation includes, among others, Tabellini (1991) Aghion Bolton (1990)
Dixit and Lodregan (2000) and Di Gioacchino et al. (2003). See this last paper for a brief survey of this literature.
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residents’ aggregate welfare given government accountability to the general electorate. In this framework it
is possible to show that, in equilibrium, government behaves as if it were maximizing a function which is a
weighted sum of the welfare of resident and non resident families with resident families receiving a greater
weight than non resident  families.  Foreigners,  in fact,  do not vote and their eventual welfare loss is not
internalized as a political cost by the government. The government internalizes as political cost (gain) only
welfare losses (gains ) pertaining to residents.
When the government decides to repudiate public obligations, the welfare loss of foreigners corresponds to
a welfare gain for all resident families, but, since foreigners do not vote, their loss is not internalized as a
political cost by the government and thus it weights less. Political support to repudiation is then motivated
by the political gain of repudiating debt partially held by foreigners8.. It is important to underline that in this
model repudiation would not receive political support if debt were entirely held by residents Thus, the main
determinant of the political equilibrium is the share of national debt held by foreign residents: the greater is
this share the greater the political support to repudiation.
3 The model
Consider a two-period, two-country economy with overlapping generations. The countries, H (domestic)
and F (foreign), belong to a Monetary Union. Monetary policy is decided by the Union’s Central Bank
while fiscal policy is set by each national government. 
3.1 Families
In each country there are two generations: parents and kids. Parents are born in period 1 and live two
periods. Kids are born in period 2 and live only one period. Parents in the whole Union are a continuum of
measure one and each parent has n kids.
In the first period there is no production and parents differ in their exogenous initial endowment of
wealth. The initial wealth in country K, with  FHK , , is distributed according to a known distribution
K, with mean aK and support (0, Ka ), where Ka  is a positive and finite real-valued scalar9. In the second
period, at birth each kid receives one unit of labour that is inelastically supplied at a given gross real wage
w, while parents receive a second endowment e. 
In period 2 parents and kids take consumption decisions to maximize family’s welfare. A family is
composed by one parent and n kids. Consider the k-th family and let dk and xk denote, respectively, parent’s
and kids’ consumption. We assume the following family utility function:
  FHkxnVdZ kkk  2 (1)
8 Few theoretical works investigate this point. An exception is represented by Drazen (1998). He argues that there exists
a  strong  political  conflict  around  the  decision  to  repudiate  debt  held  by  residents,  due  to  internal  redistributive
consequences. Differently, residents’ preferences over the decision to repudiate domestic debt held by foreign residents
are homogeneous: they all prefer to repudiate partially or totally (depending on repudiation cost) and since foreigners do
not vote this will be the (political) equilibrium.
9Lower-letter  subscript  indicates  individuals;  capital-letter  subscript  indicates  countries.  Thus,  for  example,  ak is
individual wealth of the k-th individual in country K, while aK is average wealth in country K.
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where,  measures the relative altruism of parents with respect to children and V(.) is a concave and twice
continuously differentiable function.10
In  the  first  period  parents  take  consumption  and  savings  decisions  to  maximize  the  following
intertemporal utility function:
21 )( kkk ZcUZ  (2)
where ck is the k-th parent first period consumption,  U( ) is concave and twice continuously differentiable
and   is the intertemporal discount factor.
In  period  1  each  parent,  in  country  K,  receives  a  lump-sum transfer gK from government.  The
transfer is financed by issuing government debt. In period 2 debt is repaid by a combination of taxes on kids’
income and on the outstanding debt. We assume that parents’ endowments are never taxed.
The intertemporal  utility  function  (2)  is  maximized under  the family’s  budget  constraints,  one for  each
period, and the constraints of non-negativity for quantities consumed:
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where Ek is family’s income in the second period, which comes from the tax-free endowment e,  the after-tax
labour income,  wK )1(  , and savings sk. The real expected net interest factor on savings in country  K is
denoted by eKr . The labour income tax levied in country K, 10  K , is decided by the government.
3.2 Governments Budget Constraints
If in the first period the k-th parent desires to save, he can either buy bonds issued by country H (bk)
or by country F (βk). We assume that the two bonds are perfect substitutes. This means that the expected real
interest factor on domestic public debt (re) must be equal, in equilibrium, to the expected real interest factor
on  foreign debt  ( e ).Thus  foreign  and  domestic  portfolios  in  equilibrium earn  the  same expected  real
interest factor  eeeK rr  . For the sake of simplicity we impose a unique portfolio composition for all
savers in each country K.
We summarize the above with the following:
Assumption 1
(i) kbs kkk  0 ; 
(ii) kKk sb   and   kKk s  1 , with  1,0K .
10 The  assumption that  the  family utility function is  quasi-linear  is  equivalent  to  assuming that  it  is  measurable  in
monetary terms.
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Assumption 1.i is, admittedly, very strong. We exclude private borrowing. This can be justified by
referring to imperfections in capital markets that prevent individuals, who are consumption constrained in
the first period, from borrowing11,. In the first period, each government  K must decide the amount of the
lump sum transfer gK. The transfer is financed by either domestic or foreign borrowing. Therefore, the first
period government budget constraints in country H and F are, respectively:
  HgHb Pr (4)
  FgFPr (5)
where  b(β) is the average amount of domestic (foreign) paper held by parents (resident and non-resident)
and Pr(K) is the share of parents living in country K12. Let bH ( H ) and bF ( F ) be respectively the average
amount  of  domestic  (foreign)  debt  held  by  residents  and  by  non-residents,  it  follows  that
)Pr()Pr( FbHbb FH   and ).Pr()Pr( FH FH  
In the second period government  K can choose to repay its debt by a combination of taxes on the
kids’ labour income (τK) and on the outstanding debt. The political decision rule will be specified below.
The debt tax can be either explicit or implicit (i.e. inflation-derived). As for implicit taxation, recall
that countries belong to a Monetary Union, thus, they cannot directly control the inflation tax. However,
they might try to achieve their desired results about inflation by a vote in the UCB Governing Council. 
Thus, the second period domestic government’s budget constraint can be written as:
    wnHbqrb HHIEH   Pr1 (6)
where qH is the nominal interest factor promised on domestic public debt in the first period, H E measures
explicit taxation and  I implicit taxation,.
Similarly, foreign government’s budget constraint is:
    wnFq FFIEF   Pr1 (7)
A political–economic equilibrium must satisfy three conditions: (i) economic equilibrium: for any
given  policy,  economic  decisions  are  optimal  for  economic  agents  and  markets  clear;  (ii)  political
equilibrium: the policy implemented by the government is weakly preferred to any other policy given the
assumed decision rule; (iii) Rationality: economic agents have rational expectations.
4. Economic equilibrium
4.1  Consumption and Saving decisions
In this section economic agents take current and future policies as given. Solving the  k-th parent
optimisation problem, we obtain:
11 We posit such assumption in order to give public debt the role of redistributing income over time. If capital markets
were perfect, there would be no need to use public debt for such purpose.
12 Obviously,     1PrPr  FH .
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From (8),  optimal  consumption  is  equal  to  )(1 eKc rU 
  .  However,  if  the  k-th  parent  is  wealth-
constrained,  he cannot  consume more than  ak+gK and his  savings will  be nil.  From the last  expression,
average savings per parent in country K are given by: 
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Solving the second period optimization problem of the generic family k we get:
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where *k  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the k-th family’s budget constraint. The fact that the
Lagrange multiplier  is  equal  to one implies that  the indirect  utility function is separable in income (see
below)13. Note  that  kids’ consumption is  independent  of family income but  is  determined solely by the
coefficient  α,  measuring  relative  altruism.  Parents’  consumption  equals  family  income  less  children’s
consumption. We assume that the non-negativity constraints on the quantities consumed are satisfied14.
4.2 Bonds Market Equilibrium
Since debt obligations issued by the two governments are perfect substitutes, a unique bonds market
exists in the Monetary Union. The equilibrium interest factor, ** r , can thus be derived by the following
market clearing condition: 
13 This follows from the quasi-linearity of the family utility function.
14 The conditions of non-negativity of the quantities consumed are the following:
      
      






irbxwnanxEd
jrbxwnanxEd
kx
iiHHii
jjFFjj
k
010
010
00
***
***
*



Substituting the government’s budget constraint into the last condition we get:
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where  RH are the resources, before taxes and net of children’s consumption, at the disposal of each resident family,
independently of its possession of government securities. Since this inequality must hold for all values of bi and βi and
since min[bi] = min[βi] = 0, we get an expression that sets the upper limit amount of debt that home government may
issue: 
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By Walras’s law (12), (3), (6) and (7) imply that good markets are also in equilibrium.
If  at  least  the  poorest  parents  are  wealth  constrained  despite  the  government  transfer  (i.e.  if
)( *1 rUg cK 
 ), it is easy to verify that 15
 FH ggrr ,**   with 0
*



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(13)
Since some of the constrained parents must be induced to forgo current consumption to buy public
debt, issuing debt raises the equilibrium rate of return.
5. The political game
In the present section we consider the political game played, in the second period, by government H
and resident and non resident families. Once the political equilibrium at time two is worked out, we will go
back to the political and economic equilibrium at time one.
We focus on country H assuming that country F never explicitly default on public debt (i.e. 0EF )
so  that  F
I q)1(   ).16 In  the  second  period  lump-sum transfers  in  each  countries  ( FH gg , ),  bond
holdings by resident and non-resident families( FFHH bb  ,,, ) and the nominal factor of interest ( FH qq , )
are given.
Following the approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we describe the political game as a
menu auction in which families offer government H money in an effort to influence its decisions. The
government then selects the combination of  I,  E and  that maximizes its objective function17 under the
budget constraint and the condition 1 EI  . The choice of the parameters  I ,  E and   is not
independent but linked by the budget constraint. The government thus has only two independent control
variables; consequently, in what follows we shall represent the government’s decision as the choice of a pair
( I,  E). Since the money contributions offered by each family depend on family resources and on the
15 When no parent is wealth-constrained the lump sum transfer is completely saved, in order to finance future taxation.
In this case the average saving per family becomes    eKcKKeKKK rUgargs   1,  and the equilibrium condition
simplifies to      *1PrPr rUaFaHa cFH    . Thus the equilibrium interest factor does not depend on government
expenditure but only on the intertemporal discount rate and on the (marginal utility of) average initial wealth in the
whole Union: )(
1* aUr c
 .
16 In what follows, to simplify notation, we write E  instead of EH .
17 Strictly speaking, the government does not choose  I which is set by the UCB, but it appoints a member of the UCB’
board who will influence the UCB’s choice by voting for the level of  I  preferred by the government.
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government’s choice, we shall designate by ),,,( kk
IE
k bCC   the contribution function of the generic
family k. Knowing these functions, the government sets E and compute its preferred I so as to maximize
its objective function which we assume to be a weighted sum of the welfare of resident families and of the
contributions from all families, including non-residents, net of a cost attached to explicit debt repudiation,
 E . Indicating  the generic family resident in country H by i and the non resident family (resident in
country F) with j,18 government H’s objective function is:
     
    ).(d,,,Pr
d,,,dPr,
0
00
E
a
Fjj
IE
a
Hii
IE
a
Hi
IE
H
F
HH
bCF
bCWHG















(14)
Assumption 2:  E  is a, non-decreasing, twice continuously differentiable, convex function: 
i) 0)0( 
ii)   0' E ,   0 E
The  parameter   measure  the  relative  weight  assigned  by  government  H to  residents’  welfare
relative to monetary contributions. Supposing that voters are more likely to re-elect a government that has
delivered a high standard of living,  can be interpreted as an indicator of the incumbent government’ fears
of losing voters due to the implementation of socially costly policies (see Grossman Helpman, 1993). Thus
implenting an inefficient policy (from the domestic social welfare point of view) bears a cost that stems
from incumbent government accountability to the general electorate.
As far as inflation is concerned, we assume that each family tries to influence only its own government;
thus, we have the following:
Assumption  3:  Non-resident  families  do  not  try  to  influence  government  H’s  preferred  I ;  that  is,
),,(),,,( jj
E
jjj
IE
j bCCbCC   .
An equilibrium for  the political  game is  constituted by a couple  ( IE  , )  which maximizes the
government’s  objective  function  and  a  vector  of  contributions,  each  of  which  is  optimal  given  the
government’s choice and the contributions of the other families19.
18 With k we continue to indicate a generic family or parent resident in country K 
19 Bernheim and Whinston (1986) have shown that a vector of contribution functions and a government-set vector of
policy variables   oKkok dC , , are an equilibrium if and only if:
(i) every okC  is admissible;
(ii) do maximizes G(d);
(iii) do maximizes KkGCW kk  ;
(iv)   0 kkk dCdKk , where dk  maximizes G(d).
See Di Gioacchino et al. (1999, 2000) for a discussion of these conditions.
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Assuming that the contribution functions are differentiable,20 the conditions that must be fulfilled in
order to have an equilibrium21 imply that the functions must be locally truthful22. In other terms:
kEkE WC 


   and iIiI WC 


  (15)
Truthful contribution  functions  require  that  families  offer  money  grants  that  reflect  their  true
willingness to pay.23 The condition that they be locally truthful requires that they be truthful around the
equilibrium. 24
Nash  equilibria  supported  by  truthful  contribution  schedules  have  an  interesting  property.  The
equilibrium pair ( IE ** , ) satisfies the following:
   








  )(dPrd)1(Prmaxarg),(
00
** E
a
FJ
a
Hi
IE
FH
WFWH  (16)
where, by ass. 3,  =1 when foreign families are actively involved in the lobbying activity, otherwise  =0.
Equation (16) says that, in equilibrium, the government behaves as if it were maximizing a function which is
a weighted sum of the welfare of resident  and non resident families.  Resident  families receive a weight
equal to 1+ , while non resident families receive a weight equal to 1 or 0. In fact, by assumption 3, when
choosing I  government H does not take into account foreigners’ welfare. As for the choice of E , since
non-resident families are assumed to be actively involved in the lobbying activity, their welfare will enter
government H’s objective function but it will receive a lower weight than resident families. Foreigners, in
fact,  do  not  vote  and  their  welfare  loss  is  not  internalized  as  a  political  cost  by  the  government.  The
government internalizes as political cost only welfare losses pertaining to residents.
5.1 Political Preferences
Let  us  now consider  resident  and non resident  families’  political  preferences  about  government  H debt
repayment decisions. Individuals’ political preferences can be derived from their indirect utility function.
20 That is, that they are robust with respect to small errors of calculation; if the functions were not differentiable, then a
family could suffer a large loss as a result of a small error in calculation.
21 Conditions (ii) and (iii) in note 20 above.
22 See Di Gioacchino et al. (1999, 2000).
23 If we allow the possibility of non-binding agreements between players, then these truthful equilibria are stable with
respect to possible deviations by coalitions of players (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1986).
24 Domestic families with HHiFiH gqqbq   , i.e.   HcH
FFHH
H
i grUgqq
q
a 

  *1 

 will offer the following
contribution function:       IiFIEiHHHHiFiHiiIE qbgqgqqbqbC  ,,, . The rest of domestic
families will offer the following contribution function:
       IiFIEHiHHHiFiHiiIE qgbqgqqbqbC   11,,, .  The  contributions  to  domestic
government by foreign savers are represented by the following function:    EjHjjjE bqbC   10,, .
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Allowing for the second period government H budget constraint, the k-th family’s indirect utility function in
the second period can be written as:
              kkkkkkkIEk xnVnxExnVdbW ,,, (17)
Since kids’ consumption is not affected by governments’ policies, it follows that:
kEkE
EW



  and kIkI EW 


  (18)
To compute the effect of an increase of the debt tax on resident families’ welfare,  substitute the
government budget constraint into the expression for families’ income (Ei) to get:
  iF
I
iH
IE
i qH
bbqnweE  )1(
Pr
)1( 



 (19),
which, substituted into (18), gives:
  



 iHiE bH
b
qW
Pr

(20).
This shows how resident families’ preferences about explicit repudiation depend on ownership of domestic
securities. Wealthy families (i.e. those with  H
b
bi Pr
 ), oppose explicit repudiation, and the richer the
family, the more they are hurt by this policy. By contrast, poor families (i.e. those with  H
b
bi Pr
 ), favour
explicit repudiation, the more so the poorer the family.
To calculate the reactivity of non-resident families’ indirect utility function to explicit repudiation of
country H government’ bonds, we substitute the expression for family’s income Ej (where government F
budget constraint has been substituted for)







)Pr(
)1()1(
F
qbqnweE jF
I
jH
IE
j

 (21)
into (18) and obtain:
jHjE
bqW 


(22)
This indicates that all non-resident families are hurt by explicit repudiation. For unlike residents, they do not
pay income tax to the government of country H, so they prefer that the debt be entirely repaid out of income
tax. 
Next consider families’ preferences about the inflation tax. Unlike explicit repudiation which affects
only domestic bonds, implicit repudiation reduces the real value of domestic as well as foreign securities.
Substituting the expression for families’ income into (18) we get:
  iFiHiI qbH
bqW 

 

)
Pr
( (23.a)
jHjFjI bqF
qW 





 



)Pr( (23.b)
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This  shows that  families’  preferences  about  implicit  repudiation depend on the  (ex ante)  value of  their
portfolio. Wealthy families (i.e. resident families with  H
bqbq iFiH Pr
   and non-resident families with
 Hqbq jFjH Pr
  ),  oppose  implicit  repudiation.  By  contrast,  poor  families  (i.e.  those  owning  a
portfolio whose value is less than average), gain from an inflation tax that reduces the real value of public
debt in both countries. Note that wealthy families, rich in domestic and foreign bonds  (i.e. resident families
with  H
b
bi Pr
 and  H
bqbq iFiH Pr
   and analogous inequalities for non-resident families) dislike both
kind of  repudiation  but  implicit  repudiation  is  worse as  it  reduces  the  real  value of  both  domestic  and
foreign  securities.  On  the  contrary,  the  poorest  families  (i.e.  resident  families  with   H
b
bi Pr
  and
 H
bqbq iFiH Pr
   and analogous inequalities for non-resident families) favour both kind of repudiation
but explicit repudiation brings them higher gains because it reduces only the real value of domestic bonds
which otherwise have to be paid out  of  income tax,  without  devaluing the foreign bonds hold by those
families. 
5.2 Political equilibrium
Knowing families’ contribution functions, the government chooses ( IE  , ) so as to maximize its
objective function (14) under the constraint25 1 IE  . 
Defining  the  Lagrangean  )1(),(),( IEIEIE GL   ,  the  first  order  (Kuhn-Tucker-
Lagrange) conditions are26:
  0)Pr()Pr()1( 



 HFFHI
qHbqFL 0


I
I L

 27 (24a)
0)(')Pr( 




E
FHE bqF
L 0


E
E L

 28 (24b)
25Despite  the  simplifying  assumption  of  a  unique  portfolio  composition  for  all  families,  we assume  that  family’s
endowment is private information, see Tabellini (1991). This implies that the amount of taxes paid by each family can
not be higher than real wage and owned domestic bonds.
26 These are obtained using expressions (20), (22) and (23). 
27 That is either (i) 0


I
L

 and 0I or (ii) 0


I
L

 and 0I
28 That is either (i) 0


E
L

 and 0E  or  (iii) 0


E
L

 and 0E
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01 

 IEL 

0



 L 29 (24c)
We are now in a position to determine government H preferences for implicit repudiation.
Proposition 1: Government H preferences for inflation depend on the country’s net external position. A net
creditor will always prefer  zero inflation; a net debtor will prefer a positive rate of inflation if its
imbalance is sufficiently high.
Proof: To determine the preferred rate of inflation consider expression (24a). Country H will prefer zero
inflation if either:
(i) it is a net creditor (i.e. 0)Pr()Pr(  HFFH qHbqF  ) or
(ii)  it has a balanced position (i.e. 0)Pr()Pr(  HFFH qHbqF  )30 
(iii) it  is a net debtor (i.e. 0)Pr()Pr(  HFFH qHbqF  ) and the following is met:
  )1(')Pr()Pr()Pr()1( vbqFqHbqF FHHFFH   (25)
The last conditions requires that the net marginal gain from implicit repudiation (left hand side) is lower
than the  net  marginal  gain from total  explicit  repudiation (right  hand side).  Given the  convexity  of  the
explicit repudiation cost function if  (25) is satisfied for E  =1 a fortiori it is satisfied for each E  <1.☺
From proposition 1 we can argue that a necessary condition for the government to be pro-inflation is
to  be  an  external  net  debtor. The  reason  is  that  if  country  H is  a  net  external  creditor  then  implicit
repudiation harms resident families more than non-resident ones. 
Recall that inflation is controlled by the Union Central Bank. The following specifies the decision
rule used by the UCB:
Assumption 4: The UCB takes its decisions about inflation by majority voting of the members of the board.
In case of ties, the UCB adopts an anti-inflationary policy.31
Corollary 1: Under the previous assumption, in a two country world the UCB will choose not to give way
to inflationary pressures from profligate countries.
Proof: with two countries there are only two possibilities,  either one is net creditor and the other is net
debtor or they both have a net foreign investment position in balance. In both cases assumption 4 ensures the
result.☺
29 Which together with 0   requires either (i) 0  and 0



L
 or (ii) 0  and 0



L
30 We are assuming that when indifferent to implicit repudiation the government prefers not to inflate.
31 We can justify the last part of the assumption pleading some cost of inflation.
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We have thus shown that the fear that a profligate country may successfully pressure the UCB into
loosening its monetary policy is not founded. First of all, whatever be the stock of public debt inherited from
the past a country has got an incentive to pressure the UCB for inflation if and only if its external position is
sufficiently deteriorated. Second, its inflationary pressures will be offset by opposite pressures from external
net creditor countries. 
When money creation  offers  no easy way out,  politicians  have only two alternatives  left:  either
explicit default or raising taxes on labour income. In the following proposition we compute the equilibrium
value of  explicit  repudiation  E  when  0I  and show that the higher the nominal value of domestic
bonds held  by non-resident  families  and  the  weight   given  to  the  welfare  of  resident  families  by the
government, the higher will be explicit repudiation.
Proposition 2: Under assumption 2, if 0I , then the government will choose:
i. total default IFF )1(')Pr(  FH bqF ; 1* E
ii. no default IFF )0(')Pr(  FH bqF ; 0* E
iii.  partial default IFF )1(')Pr()0('   FHbqF ; ))Pr((' 1* FH
E bqFv  
Proof: Obvious from 24(b) and 24(c) ☺
Intuitively,  when  the  constraint  1E  is  not  binding,  the  value  of  E  which  maximizes  the
government objective  function  corresponds  to  the  point  where  the marginal  cost  of  explicit  repudiation
)(' E  is equal to the marginal gain from repudiation, FH bqF )Pr( . 
7. Politically viable stock of debt and political equilibrium in period 1
We now turn to a description of the political equilibrium in period 1. Under rational expectations , if 0I
, the expected net of tax factor of return on public debt,, )1( *EH
e qr  , must be equal to the factor of
interest that clears the market for public debt in period 1, );(* FH ggr . 
Recalling that HgHb )Pr( , and given proposition 2, parents in period 1 realize that country H’s public
debt will be fully repaid in equilibrium and ),(* FHFH ggrqq  , if, and only if:
)0('));
)Pr(
(*();
)Pr(
(*)Pr( vg
H
brsg
H
brF FFFF   (26).
Therefore, the politically viable set of values of public debt is defined by the inequality
 F
vg
H
brsg
H
br
F
FFF Pr
)0(';
)Pr(
*;
)Pr(
*



















(27)
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No debt outside the politically viable set can be sold since nobody would buy it. It is immediate to verify
that the upper bound of the politically viable set, implicitly defined by (27), is a decreasing function of the
weight  given to aggregate resident welfare in the government objective function. The higher this weight
the higher the government political  gain of repudiating debt. In fact, if debt were held only by residents
repudiation would not affect aggregate welfare since among resident families losses an gains offset. When a
share of debt is held by foreigners what is not repaid to them represents a net gain for all resident families.
Furthermore, since foreigners do not vote, their welfare loss is not internalized as a political cost by the
government. The government internalizes as political cost only welfare losses stemming from residents. As a
consequence  political  support  to  repudiation  will  be  higher  the  greater  is  the  weight  given  by  the
government to aggregate resident  welfare with respect  to monetary contributions.  Furthermore, since the
higher  the  share  of  debt  held  by  foreigners,  the  greater  is  the  increase  in  residents’  aggregate  welfare
stemming from repudiation, the upper bound of the public debt politically viable set  will be a decreasing
function of  the relative size of the foreign country,  )Pr(F , and of the propensity to diversify financial
investments of foreigners denoted by F .
Consider  now the  determinants  of  the  equilibrium intergenerational  redistribution.  The  welfare
effect on the k-th parent of marginally raising the transfer gK is given by: 
             KKFHkFHkkKFHkk ggggrsggrxnVxwnegggrcUW   ,,,,, *****1 
where we have substituted  FHek ggrr ,* .
The welfare effect of marginally raising gK on the utility function of parent k is32:
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The impact of the policy transfer on parents’ welfare is the result of two effects: a direct effect on
income and an indirect effect, which operates through the change in the interest factor. The first effect is
always non-negative. 33 The indirect effect is evaluated differently by different families. Issuing debt raises
the rate of return and this redistributes income from poor to wealthy families. Hence this term is positive for
families wealthier than average, (i.e. those with kk gs 
* ) but it can be negative for poor families. 
Thus, even when debt is eventually repaid, a political conflict exists in the first period concerning
how much debt to issue. Since the main focus of our analysis was to investigate on the political determinants
32This is computed noting that each additional unit of gK is either consumed, if the family is wealth constrained, or saved.
Therefore 
K
k
g
c

 *
 and 
K
k
g
s

 *
 are either zero or one.
33For families with positive savings this effect is nil and it is positive for families that are consumption constraint.  In
fact, since the marginal utility of desired consumption is equal to *r , decreasing marginal utility implies *rU c   
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of ex-post repudiation, we will not solve for the political equilibrium in period 1. For our purposes it  is
sufficient  to  say  that  whatever  be  the  solution  of  the  first  period  political  conflict  the  level  of  the
intergenerational redistribution can never exceed the upper bound derived from the public debt politically
viable set. However expectations of an UCB ex-post bail-out stops market discipline from operating. In this
case fiscal constraints are needed in order avoid moral hazard behaviour. The point we make is that such
fiscal constraints should differ among countries according to the level of debt held by foreigners. 
7. Conclusion
The Stability and Growth Pact is one of the pilasters of the EMU. It constrains members’ fiscal
policies with definite limits on deficit spending. The fiscal constraints are founded implicitly on the belief
that in a monetary union the market cannot establish fiscal discipline. What blocks the free play of market
forces is the belief that in the event of a fiscal crisis the ECB would intervene and monetize the problem
country’s debt. In other words, the fiscal constraints reflect doubts on the credibility of the no-bail-out rule.
The problem of ECB intervention arises when the government of the fiscally exposed country elects
not to honour its debt fully. Here, we examine the determinants of such a decision in a political economy
framework. The main result of our model is that a debt management policy directed at lowering effective
yields (repudiation) might be the dominant option for a self-interested government whose creditors consist
in part of foreigners.  If the debt is held only by residents, even an arbitrarily low cost of repudiation is
sufficient to avert that outcome.
With the advent of EMU and the consequent end of differences in the tax treatment of governments’
securities as well as of foreign exchange risk, there has been broader international diffusion of governments’
paper. Thus the risk of repudiation becomes more concrete by comparison with a situation in which public
debt is held only by resident investors. Within the profligate country, in fact, each individual prefers that the
foreign debt be at least partially repudiated.
Insofar as repudiation jeopardizes the soundness of the banking system (given banks’ exposure to
government debt) or the stability of the securities’ markets, it is likely that the ECB will intervene after the
fact with an inflation-based or fiscal bail-out whose costs will be borne by all the countries of the Union.
The Stability Pact can thus be read as an instrument for correcting the inefficiencies created by free-riding
consequent to an ex-post bail-out on the part of the ECB. What our model highlights – differing in this from
the rest of the literature – is that the impact of the fiscal position of the various member countries on the
Monetary Union stability does not depend on the stock of debt but on the proportion of it that is held abroad.
Our  results  have  a  number  of  implications  for  the  current  debate  on  reforming  EU rules  and
institutions. With reference to the proposal,  advanced in the EEAG Report (2003),  of  letting the deficit
ceiling depend explicitly on the country’s debt level, our contribution suggests that what is really relevant is
not the stock of national debt but the share of it held abroad. Similarly, with respect to Casella’s (2001)
proposal  of  substituting  homogeneous  deficit  ceilings  with  tradable  deficit  permits,  we  claim  that  the
number of permits assigned to each country should negatively depend on the foreign exposure. 
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